The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods.
SAP Serving Attachment Point [RFC5836] 3. ERP/AAK Description ERP/AAK is intended to allow (upon request by the peer) the establishment of cryptographic keying materials on a single Candidate Attachment Point prior to the arrival of the peer at the Candidate Access Network (CAN).
In this document, ERP/AAK support by the peer is assumed. Also, it is assumed that the peer has previously completed full EAP authentication and that either the peer or the SAP knows the identities of neighboring attachment points. Note that the behavior of a peer that does not support the ERP-AAK scheme defined in this specification is out of the scope of this document. Figure 1 shows the general protocol exchange by which the keying material is established on the CAP. | | In the latter case, the SAP MAY send the identity of one or more Candidate Attachment Points to which the SAP is adjacent to the peer in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start message (see step a in Figure 1 ). The peer SHOULD override the identity of CAP(s) carried in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start message by sending EAP-Initiate/Re-auth with the E flag set if it knows to which CAP it will move. If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the peer, it MUST be silently discarded.
If the peer initiates ERP/AAK, the peer MAY send an earlyauthentication request message (EAP-Initiate/Re-auth with the E flag set) containing the keyName-NAI, the CAP-Identifier, rIK, and sequence number (see step b in Figure 1 ). The realm in the keyName-NAI field is used to locate the peer's ERP/AAK server. The CAPIdentifier is used to identify the CAP. The re-authentication Integrity Key (rIK) is defined by Narayanan & Dondeti in [RFC5296] and is used to protect the integrity of the message. The sequence number is used for replay protection. verification succeeds, the SAP SHOULD encapsulate the earlyauthentication message into a AAA message and send it to the peer's ERP/AAK server in the realm indicated in the keyName-NAI field (see step c in Figure 1 ).
Upon receiving the message, the ERP/AAK server MUST first use the keyName indicated in the keyName-NAI to look up the rIK and check the integrity and freshness of the message. Then, the ERP/AAK server MUST verify the identity of the peer by checking the username portion of the KeyName-NAI. If any of the checks fail, the server MUST send an early-authentication finish message (EAP-Finish/Re-auth with E flag set) with the Result flag set to '1'. Next, the server MUST authorize the CAP specified in the CAP-Identifier TLV. In the success case, the server MUST derive a pMSK from the pRK for the CAP carried in the CAP-Identifier field using the sequence number associated with CAP-Identifier as an input to the key derivation. (see step d in Figure 1 ).
Then, the ERP/AAK server MUST transport the pMSK to the authorized CAP via AAA (see Section 7) as illustrated above (see steps e.1 and e.2 in Figure 2 ). Note that key distribution in Figure 2 is one part of step d in Figure 1 .
Finally, in response to the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message, the ERP/AAK server SHOULD send the early-authentication finish message (EAP---Finish/Re-auth with E flag set) containing the identity of the authorized CAP to the peer via the SAP along with the lifetime of the pMSK. If the peer also requests the rRK Lifetime, the ERP/AAK server SHOULD send the rRK Lifetime in the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message (see steps f and g in Figure 1 ).
ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy
ERP/AAK uses a key hierarchy similar to that of ERP. The ERP/AAK pre-established Root Key (pRK) is derived from either the EMSK or the DSRK as specified below (see Section 4.1). In general, the pRK is derived from the EMSK if the peer is located in the home AAA realm and derived from the DSRK if the peer is in a visited realm. The DSRK is delivered from the EAP server to the ERP/AAK server as specified in [KEYTRAN] . If the peer has previously been authenticated by means of ERP or ERP/AAK, the DSRK SHOULD be directly reused. The rRK is derived as specified in [RFC5295] . The pMSK label is the 8-bit ASCII string:
EAP Early-Authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org
The length field refers to the length of the pMSK in octets encoded as specified in RFC 5295. SEQ is sent by either the peer or the server in the ERP/AAK message using the SEQ field or the Sequence number TLV. It is encoded as a 16-bit number as specified in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Packet and TLV Extension
This section describes the packet and TLV extensions for the ERP/AAK exchange. 'L' -As defined in Section 5.3.2 of [RFC5296] , this bit is used to request the key lifetimes from the server.
EAP-Initiate
'E' -The E flag is used to indicate early authentication.
The first bit(R) and final 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on reception.
SEQ
As defined in Section 5.3.2 of [RFC5296] , this field is 16-bit sequence number and used for replay protection.
TVs and TLVs keyName-NAI: As defined in [RFC5296] , this is carried in a TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not exceeding 253 octets. The username part of the NAI is the EMSKname used to identify the peer. The realm part of the NAI is the peer's home domain name if the peer communicates with the home EA server or the domain to which the peer is currently attached (i.e., local domain name) if the peer communicates with a local EA server. The SAP knows whether the KeyName-NAI carries the local domain name by comparing the domain name carried in the KeyName-NAI with the local domain name that is associated with the SAP. Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet and the realm part of it SHOULD follow the use of internationalized domain names defined in [RFC5890] .
CAP-Identifier: Carried in a TLV payload. The Type is 11. This field is used to indicate the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of a CAP. The value field MUST be encoded as specified in Section 8 of [RFC3315] . Exactly one instance of the CAP-Identifier TLV MUST be present in the ERP/AAK-Key TLV.
Sequence number: The Type is 7. The value field is a 16-bit field and used in the derivation of the pMSK for a CAP.
Cryptosuite
This field indicates the integrity algorithm used for ERP/AAK. Key lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious from the cryptosuite name, e.g., HMAC-SHA256-128 denotes Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) computed using the SHA-256 function [RFC4868] with 256-bit key length and the output truncated to 128 bits [RFC2104] . We specify some cryptosuites below:
HMAC-SHA256-128 3 HMAC-SHA256-256
HMAC-SHA256-128 is REQUIRED to implement, and it SHOULD be enabled in the default configuration.
Authentication Tag
This field contains an integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet from the first bit of the Code field to the last bit of the Cryptosuite field, excluding the Authentication Tag field itself. The value field is calculated using the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite field and rIK specified in [RFC5296] as the secret key. The length of the field is indicated by the Cryptosuite.
The peer uses the Authentication Tag to determine the validity of the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message from the server.
If the message doesn't pass verification or the Authentication Tag is not included in the message, the message SHOULD be discarded silently.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it SHOULD be discarded silently. The peer MUST maintain retransmission timers for reliable transport of the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message.
If there is no response to the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from the server after the necessary number of retransmissions (see Section 6), the peer MUST assume that ERP/AAK is not supported by the SAP. List of Cryptosuites Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is 5 [RFC5296] . The value field contains a list of cryptosuites (at least one cryptosuite SHOULD be included), each 1 octet in length. The allowed cryptosuite values are as specified in Section 5.2. The server SHOULD include this attribute if the cryptosuite used in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message was not acceptable and the message is being rejected. The server MAY include this attribute in other cases. The server MAY use this attribute to signal its cryptographic algorithm capabilities to the peer.
EAP-

-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | 1 or more TVs or TLVs ˜ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ˜ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Cryptosuite
This field indicates the integrity algorithm and PRF used for ERP/ AAK. HMAC-SHA256-128 is REQUIRED to implement, and it SHOULD be enabled in the default configuration. Key lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious from the cryptosuite name.
Authentication Tag
This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet from the first bit of the Code field to the last bit of the Cryptosuite field, excluding the Authentication Tag field itself. The value field is calculated using the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite field and the rIK [RFC5296] as the integrity key. The length of the field is indicated by the corresponding Cryptosuite.
The peer uses the authentication tag to determine the validity of the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message from a server.
If the message doesn't pass verification or the authentication tag is not included in the message, the message SHOULD be discarded silently.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it is discarded silently. The peer MUST maintain retransmission timers for reliable transport of the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. If there is no response to the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from the server after the necessary number of retransmissions (see Section 6), the peer MUST assume that ERP/AAK is not supported by the SAP.
TV and TLV Attributes
With the exception of the rRK Lifetime and rMSK Lifetime TV payloads, the attributes specified in Section 5. 
AAA Transport Considerations
The AAA transport of ERP/AAK messages is the same as that of the ERP message [RFC5296] . In addition, this document requires AAA transport of the ERP/AAK keying materials delivered by the ERP/AAK server to the CAP. Hence, a new AAA message for the ERP/AAK application should be specified to transport the keying materials.
Security Considerations
This section provides an analysis of the protocol in accordance with the AAA key management requirements specified in [RFC4962] . o Limit key scope: The scope of all the keys derived by ERP-AAK is well defined. The pRK is used to derive the pMSK for the CAP. Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to derive a unique pMSK.
o Replay detection mechanism: For replay protection, a sequence number associated with the pMSK is used. The peer increments the sequence number by one after it sends an ERP/AAK message. The server sets the expected sequence number to the received sequence number plus one after verifying the validity of the received message, and it responds to the message.
o Authenticate all parties: The EAP Re-authentication Protocol provides mutual authentication of the peer and the server. The peer and SAP are authenticated via ERP. The CAP is authenticated and trusted by the SAP.
o Peer and authenticator authorization:
The peer and authenticator demonstrate possession of the same keying material without disclosing it, as part of the lower-layer secure authentication protocol.
o Keying material confidentiality: The peer and the server derive the keys independently using parameters known to each entity.
o Uniquely named keys: All keys produced within the ERP context can be referred to uniquely as specified in this document.
o Prevent the domino effect: Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to derive the unique pMSK so that the compromise of one pMSK does not hurt any other CAP.
o Bind key to its context: The pMSKs are bound to the context in which the sequence numbers are transmitted.
o Confidentiality of identity: This is the same as with ERP [RFC5296] .
o Authorization restriction: All the keys derived are limited in lifetime by that of the parent key or by server policy. Any domain-specific keys are further restricted to be used only in the domain for which the keys are derived. Any other restrictions of session keys may be imposed by the specific lower layer and are out of scope for this specification. This document reuses the cryptosuites that were created for "Re-authentication Cryptosuites" in [RFC5296] .
Further, IANA has added a new label in the "User Specific Root Keys (USRK) Key Labels" sub-registry of the "Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Parameters" registry, as follows:
EAP Early-Authentication Root Key@ietf.org
A new registry for the flags in the EAP Initiate/Re-auth-Start message called the "EAP Initiate/Re-auth-Start Flags" has been created and a new flag (E) has been assigned as follows:
The rest of the values in the 8-bit field are reserved. New values can be assigned by Standards Action or IESG Approval [RFC5226] .
A new registry for the flags in the EAP Initiate/Re-auth message called the "EAP Initiate/Re-auth Flags" has also been created. The following flags are reserved:
(R) 0x80 [RFC5296] (B) 0x40 [RFC5296] (L) 0x20 [RFC5296] This document assigns a new flag (E) as follows:
The rest of the values in the 8-bit field are reserved. New values can be assigned by Standards Action or IESG Approval.
Further, this document creates a new registry for the flags in the EAP Finish/Re-auth message called the "EAP Finish/Re-auth Flags".
The following values are assigned.
